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Saturday, December 5, 2015

Federal Bureau Investigation into Genocide of The United States

§ 16.96 28 CFR Ch. I (7–1–15 Edition)
their activities are under or may be-
come the subject of an investigation
and could enable the subjects to avoid
detection, to influence witnesses im-
properly, to destroy evidence, or to fab-
ricate testimony.
Since an exemption is being claimed
for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to
Records) the rules required pursuant to
subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inap-
plicable to this system of records to
the extent that this system of records
is exempted from subsection (d).
(e) The following system of records is
exempt from subsections (c)(3) and
(d)(1) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(5): Files of Applicants
for Attorney and Non-Attorney Posi-
tions with the Tax Division, Justice/
TAX–003. These exemptions apply only
to the extent that information in a
record is subject to exemption pursu-
ant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).
(f) Exemption from the particular
subsections is justified for the fol-
lowing reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) because an
accounting could reveal the identity of
confidential sources and result in an
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of
others. Many persons are contacted
who, without an assurance of anonym-
ity, refuse to provide information con-
cerning an applicant for a position
with the Tax Division. Disclosure of an
accounting could reveal the identity of
a source of information and constitutes
a breach of the promise of confiden-
tiality by the Tax Division. This would
result in the reduction in the free flow
of information vital to a determination
of an applicant's qualifications and
suitability for federal employment.
(2) From subsection (d)(1) because
disclosure of records in the system
could reveal the identity of confiden-
tial sources and result in an unwar-
ranted invasion of the privacy of oth-
ers. Many persons are contacted who,
without an assurance of anonymity,
refuse to provide information con-
cerning an applicant for a Tax Division
position. Access could reveal the iden-
tity of the source of the information
and constitute a breach of the promise
of confidentiality on the part of the
Tax Division. Such breaches ultimately
would restrict the free flow of informa-
tion vital to a determination of an ap-
plicant's qualifications and suitability.
[Order No. 742–77, 42 FR 40906, Aug. 12, 1977,
as amended by Order No. 6–86, 51 FR 15478,
Apr. 24, 1986; Order No. 003–2006, 71 FR 11309,
Mar. 7, 2006]
§ 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau
of Investigation Systems—limited
access.
(a) The following system of records is
exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d),
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G) and (H),
(e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g):
(1) Central Records System (CRS)
(JUSTICE/FBI-002).
These exemptions apply only to the ex-
tent that information in this system is
subject to exemption pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552(j) and (k). Where compliance
would not appear to interfere with or
adversely affect the overall law en-
forcement process, the applicable ex-
emption may be waived by the FBI.
(b) Exemptions from the particular
subsections are justified for the fol-
lowing reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) because
making available to a record subject
the accounting of disclosures from
records concerning him/her would re-
veal investigative interest by not only
the FBI, but also by the recipient agen-
cy. This would permit the record sub-
ject to take appropriate measures to
impede the investigation, e.g., destroy
evidence, intimidate potential wit-
nesses or flee the area to avoid the
thrust of the investigation.
(2)(i) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G)
and (H), (f) and (g) because these provi-
sions concern individual access to in-
vestigative records, compliance with
which could compromise sensitive in-
formation classified in the interest of
national security, interfere with the
overall law enforcement process by re-
vealing a pending sensitive investiga-
tion, possibly identify a confidential
source or disclose information which
would constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of another individual's personal
privacy, reveal a sensitive investiga-
tive technique, or constitute a poten-
tial danger to the health or safety to
law enforcement personnel.
(ii) Also, individual access to non-
criminal investigative records, e.g.,
civil investigations and administrative
Continue into The United States Department of Justice to enforce General Genocide individual

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